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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze political parties’ campaign communication during the 2009 European Parlia-
ment election in 11 countries (Aus, Bul, CZ, Ger, Hun, NL, Pol, Port, Sp, Sw, UK). We study which 
types of issues Euroskeptic fringe and Euroskeptic mainstream parties put on their campaign agendas 
and the kind and extent of EU opposition they voice. Further, we seek to understand whether Eu-
roskeptic and non-Euroskeptic parties co-orient themselves towards each other within their national 
party systems with regard to their campaigns. To understand the role of Euroskeptic parties in the 
2009 European Parliament elections, we draw on a systematic content analysis of parties’ posters and 
televised campaign spots. Our results show that it is Euroskeptic parties at the edges of the political 
spectrum who discuss polity questions of EU integration and who most openly criticize the Union. 
Principled opposition against the project of EU integration, however, can only be observed in the UK. 
Finally, we find indicators for co-orientation effects regarding the tone of EU mobilization: In national 
political environments where Euroskeptic parties strongly criticize the EU, pro-European parties at the 
same time publicly advance pro-EU positions.  
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(1) Introduction 
For a long time, EU integration has been regarded as a political process which is depoliticized and 
uncontested. This depoliticized form of integration has been characterized, on the one hand, by citi-
zens’ permissive consensus (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970). On the other hand, it was national parties, 
social movements as well as the mass media – the intermediary organizations of our societies – that 
did not publicly communicate European matters and did not place them on the public agendas. How-
ever, more and more researchers challenge the idea of a depoliticized integration process in Europe. 
On the side of citizens, support for EU integration has been declining since the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). Eijk and Franklin (2004) were able to show that citi-
zens’ pro- and anti-EU orientations constitute relatively stable attitudes and that these attitudes do not 
only differ, but are more extreme than citizens’ attitudes on the left-right dimension. Such attitudes, 
they claim, “constitute something of a ‘sleeping giant’ that has the potential, if awakened, to impel 
voters to political behavior that… undercuts the bases for contemporary party mobilization in many, if 
not most, European polities” (Eijk & Franklin, 2004, p. 32).  
 
Scientific dispute today refers to the degree of awakening of this sleeping giant. It is the intermediary 
organizations, specifically the parties, that foster or hinder such a process – others would call it the 
politicization of EU integration. Only if these organizations publicly advance EU matters and contest 
different positions will it be likely that voters will engage in political behavior (De Wilde, 2007). Eijk 
and Franklin (2004) claim that parties still offer little choice with respect to EU integration but still 
follow a silent pro-EU consensus. But even these authors see it as only a matter of time “before policy 
entrepreneurs… seize the opportunity… to differentiate themselves from other parties in EU terms” 
(Eijk & Franklin, 2004, p. 47). Other researchers observe that Euroskeptic parties have already started 
to break the silent pro-European consensus of the mainstream (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2006) as EU mobiliza-
tion offers them the opportunity to differentiate themselves from others and thereby win votes.  
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In our eyes, it is time to go beyond “lots of speculations” (Kriesi, 2008, p. 224) and actually empirical-
ly tackle the question how Euroskeptic parties campaign against Europe and how this might result in 
processes of co-orientation between Euroskeptics and non-Euroskeptics. Thereby we focus on the 
campaign communication during the 2009 European Parliament elections. The data for this study were 
collected within the framework of the project “Between Integration and Demarcation. Strategies and 
Effects of Party Campaigns in the Context of the 2009 European Parliament Election.”1 For this paper 
we analyze the data from a systematic content analysis of parties’ posters and televised spots in the 
2009 EP campaign in 11 countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK). These countries were chosen because all of them 
have Euroskeptic parties and most even have different types of Euroskeptic parties. 
 
On the basis of this data, we study how Euroskeptic parties publicly articulate and contest EU integra-
tion in their EP campaigns. We are especially interested in finding out if there are systematic differ-
ences between different types of Euroskeptic parties, i.e., Euroskeptic fringe and Euroskeptic main-
stream parties. More specifically, we address the research questions which type of EU-issues Eu-
roskeptic fringe and mainstream parties address in their campaigns and whether these parties differ 
with regard to the degree and form of EU opposition. Second, we analyze whether there is a co-
orientation between Euroskeptic parties and pro-European parties with regard to the type of EU-issues 
addressed in the campaigns and the willingness to voice their position in reference to European inte-
gration.  
To answer these questions, we proceed in five steps. First, we need to define what Euroskepticism 
means in reference to parties and which parties have as yet been classified as Euroskeptic. Second, we 
derive hypotheses about the role of such Euroskeptic parties for EU politicization from the literature. 
                                                     
1
 This project was directed by Michaela Maier (University of Koblenz-Landau) and Silke Adam (University of Bern). Partial 
funding was granted by the research group (Kollegforschergruppe (KFG)) ‘The Transformative Power of Europe’ of the 
Freie Universität Berlin and the Department of Communication Psychology at the University of Koblenz-Landau. 
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Third, we introduce our data, operationalizations, and methods of how we identify and categorize Eu-
roskeptic and pro-European parties and how we analyze and compare their campaigns. In a fourth step, 
we present our empirical results. We end with a summary of what we have learned about the role of 
Euroskeptic parties for the politicization of European integration and where future research should 
head.  
 
 
(2) The identification of Euroskeptic parties and their location on the political spectrum  
 
Euroskeptic parties between ideology and strategy  
The conflict potential on the side of the citizens has triggered quite some research on parties’ positions 
and their mobilization strategies towards Europe. Researchers have been especially interested in those 
challenging the pro-European mainstream, namely the Euroskeptic parties. Euroskepticism is a term 
widely used, but used with different connotations (Krouwel & Abts, 2007). To clarify the term Eu-
roskepticism, we follow the general distinction made by Szczerbiak and Taggard (Szczerbiak & 
Taggard, 2003). On the one hand, Euroskepticism describes parties’ general ideological position. On 
the other hand, it is also used to describe a concrete contestatory political discourse. These two con-
cepts differ fundamentally as a party’s broad underlying ideological position may be different from 
what this party chooses to publicly advance in a specific campaign. A party might be Euroskeptic in its 
fundamental position, but for strategic reasons might decide not to voice this skepticism in the context 
of an election campaign. In contrast, there may be mainstream parties with pro-EU positions that cri-
ticize EU integration for specific matters in the context of a specific campaign. Following this reason-
ing, we distinguish between a party’s general ideological position and its strategic campaign commu-
nication. The question whether parties with an underlying Euroskeptic ideology also conduct a contes-
tatory political discourse is one guiding research question of this paper. The other central question is 
whether in a specific political environment where Euroskeptic parties publicly voice their criticism, 
pro-European mainstream parties also put specific types of EU issues on the agenda and voice their 
positions on EU integration. 
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Euroskeptic parties and their location on the left-right spectrum  
So far most research shows that Euroskeptic parties are primarily found at the fringes of the ideologi-
cal left-right spectrum (De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Eijk & Franklin, 2004; Hix & Lord, 1997; Hooghe 
& Marks, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006; Taggart, 1998). The political spectrum can been described as an 
inverted u-curve. Traditional mainstream parties with ideologically non-extremist positions are located 
in the middle of this inverted u-curve. Most of them agree on a moderate pro-integration position. At 
the edges of this inverted u-curve, we find the more extreme parties which show a stronger tendency 
toward Euroskepticism. Those at the right end of the spectrum oppose EU integration primarily on 
cultural grounds, whereas they see less of a problem with the economic dimension of EU integration. 
These parties perceive transnational integration as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation state, their 
culture, and traditions. Those at the left end of the spectrum oppose EU integration for economic rea-
sons. It is the liberal free-market character of the EU that is perceived as a threat to social welfare 
achievements (Kriesi et al., 2006). Euroskepticism in this perspective is treated as a fringe phenome-
non in the party system. However, Ray (Ray, 2007) shows that there are some important exceptions 
where Euroskepticism has been taken up by mainstream parties, especially by the center-right parties. 
Consequently, in the following we distinguish two groups of Euroskeptic parties: Euroskeptic parties 
that are located at the fringes of the party spectrum are separated from those Euroskeptic parties with 
mainstream ideology. In the following we will derive expectations about the roles that these two types 
of Euroskeptic parties play for the politicization of European integration. 
 
(3) The role of Euroskeptic parties for EU politicization – hypotheses 
Regarding the contestatory political discourse of parties, i.e., the question which type of EU-issues 
political parties raise in their campaigns, Mair (2007) identifies two mobilization dimensions: the 
functional and the Europeanization dimension. The functional dimension refers to policy areas where 
the EU already has competences. On this dimension the dispute concerns the approach and priorities. 
The Europeanization dimension in contrast refers to the shape and reach of the EU, i.e., so-called poli-
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ty issues. The type of issues which should be discussed in EP elections are functional policy issues, as 
here the European Parliament is on equal footage with national parliaments at least in those areas 
where the co-decision procedure is applied (Jones, in press). In contrast, the shape and reach of EU 
integration is still primarily decided by national politicians, and therefore these polity issues should 
rather be discussed in national elections. However, Mair (2007) claims that in reality we find the op-
posite: If political parties decide to articulate EU-issues in their election campaigns, most often these 
are polity issues which deal with the shape and reach of EU integration. Since such polity issues raise 
the fundamental questions of EU integration, we expect that Euroskeptic parties – and especially those 
at the fringes of the party spectrum – will best fit Mair’s expectation and raise polity issues in their 
campaigns. As a consequence, Hypothesis 1 dealing with the articulation of the fundamental questions 
of EU integration claims:   
H1: Euroskeptic fringe parties put EU-polity issues on the campaign agenda more often than 
Euroskeptic mainstream parties. 
 
Besides these dimensions of mobilization, another crucial variable for the description of the political 
discourse is the strength of opposition against the European Union which is put forward in the parties’ 
campaigns. Here again, we expect that the two groups of parties – although both are Euroskeptic in 
their general position – will shape contestatory political discourses very differently. We expect the 
fringe parties to voice their Euroskeptical perspectives more openly than the Euroskeptic mainstream 
parties because mainstream parties’ voicing of Euroskepticism is restricted by actual and potential 
government involvement which makes these parties part of EU decision-making on the national as 
well as European level. The best example is the Czech ODS, a conservative Euroskeptic party, whose 
leader was the President of the European Council at the time of the European election. In such a posi-
tion it is hard to openly voice Euroskepticism. On the basis of these arguments, we would expect that 
fringe parties will have more incentives (in terms of possible vote gains) and less reservations (in 
terms of possible governing duties) to openly voice their criticism of the European Union in its current 
form. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a referring to the degree of EU opposition claims:  
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H2a: Euroskeptic fringe parties articulate stronger criticism towards the European Union in its 
current form than Euroskeptic mainstream parties. 
 
Another concept closely related to the amount of criticism that Euroskeptic parties voice against the 
European Union is the form of opposition they choose. Here, researchers have worked on differentiat-
ing between soft / unprincipled opposition that refers to a number of policy areas and hard / principled 
opposition that involves the rejection of the whole integration project including demands to withdraw 
from the Union (Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003; Taggard, 1998). This soft-hard criterion allows us to 
understand whether Euroskeptics publicly fight the EU per se or whether they just advance different 
ideas about how EU integration should proceed. As we already argued above, we suppose that it is the 
parties at the fringes of the political spectrum which most likely will articulate principled opposition 
against the project of European integration. Hypothesis 2b referring to the form of EU opposition 
claims:  
H2b: Euroskeptic fringe parties voice principled opposition against EU integration more often 
than Euroskeptic mainstream parties.    
 
Our research hypotheses so far have dealt with differences between fringe and mainstream Euroskeptic 
parties. As we mentioned above, we will also seek to tackle the question whether there exists a co-
orientation between Euroskeptic and pro-European parties within each country. The rationale for this 
expansion of our research question is based on the understanding that parties strategically decide on 
their campaigns always with reference to the other competitors in their own system. No party has a 
monopoly on the overall campaign agenda. Steenbergen and Scott (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004) show 
empirically that EU mobilization of a party also affects the salience of EU-issues for other parties in 
the same country. This result is also supported for the campaign communication in six countries in the 
context of the 2009 EP elections (Adam & Maier, 2009b). It is this idea of a co-orientation between 
pro-European and Euroskeptical parties within their respective national party system that we will im-
plement in our study. First, we expect co-orientation regarding the type of EU-issues on the agenda. If 
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Euroskeptic (fringe) parties campaign on the fundamental questions regarding the shape and reach of 
EU integration in a specific country, it is likely that these polity issues will also be prominently fea-
tured on the campaign agendas of pro-European parties. Hypothesis 3 referring to co-orientation re-
garding the type of EU-issues discussed claims:  
H3: Pro-European parties will also put EU-polity issues on the agenda if Euroskeptic parties 
do so within a specific country. 
 
In a final step we ask whether co-orientation between Euroskeptic and pro-European parties also exists 
regarding a clear position on EU integration. However, here we expect a reversed effect. Clear criti-
cism from Euroskeptic parties forces the silent pro-European mainstream parties to also position them-
selves regarding EU integration and therefore to openly voice their pro-European standpoints. Hypo-
thesis 4 therefore claims that Euroskeptic opposition is accompanied by articulated EU-support and 
therefore can be labeled as politicization hypothesis:   
H4: If Euroskeptic (fringe) parties clearly voice their negative evaluation of the EU in the 
campaigns, pro-European parties will clearly state their positive views.   
 
(4) Data, operationalizations, and methods 
Before we test our hypotheses we need to describe how we identify and classify parties as Euroskeptic 
or not and as being fringe or mainstream and how we study their actual campaign communication.  
Classification of parties  
To classify parties in the eleven countries under study as Euroskeptic or non-Euroskeptic and as fringe 
or mainstream we rely on expert judgments (see the author list in this paper). Alternative sources of 
data, i.e., party manifesto data, are not available for all parties in our analysis and therefore cannot 
serve as the main basis for our classification. However, if manifesto data are available, we make use of 
them to validate our experts’ judgments. In a first step, we need to distinguish Euroskeptic parties 
from non-Euroskeptic parties. For this purpose, we use a broad concept of Euroskepticism which in-
cludes soft and hard, principled and non-principled forms of opposition as well as opposition against 
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integration per se or against the European Union as such ( for these concepts see Kopecký & Mudde, 
2002; Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003; Taggart, 1998). On the basis of this broad definition, we asked the 
experts to identify those parties that have an underlying Euroskeptic position.  
 
However, as Euroskepticism today is no longer just a fringe phenomenon (Ray, 2007), in a second 
step we further divide the group of Euroskeptic parties into parties with an extreme ideology and par-
ties that belong to the mainstream. Parties which our country experts classified as conservative / Chris-
tian democratic, liberal, social democratic, or green were rated as mainstream, whereas radical right 
and left parties classify as fringe parties. Table 1 summarizes our classification of Euroskeptic parties 
in the 11 countries on the basis of these experts’ judgments. 
 
// Table 1 
 
Table 1 indicates that we find Euroskeptic parties in all 11 countries. Our categorization supports the 
notion that Euroskepticism is not a pure fringe phenomenon anymore. In contrast, in 8 of the 11 coun-
tries mainstream parties have been classified at least as partly Euroskeptic. It is only Germany, Hun-
gary, and Spain where solely radical right- and left-wing parties are classified as Euroskeptic. In order 
to validate the judgments of our experts regarding the EU positions of parties, we rely on party mani-
festo data collected for the 2009 EP elections, more specifically on an index that subtracts all anti-EU 
statements from all positive EU references within these party manifestos. A value below 0 indicates 
Euroskepticism, whereas a value above 0 shows that EU support dominates (Braun, Mikhaylov, & 
Schmitt, 2010; EES, 2009). Overall, a comparison of these two data sources reveals satisfactory re-
sults. First, party manifesto data do not add a single Euroskeptic party to our Euroskeptic party sam-
ple. Consequently, we are sure that all Euroskeptic parties have been taken into account. Second, of 
the 32 parties that were identified as (partly) Euroskeptic by our experts, 17 also have a negative value 
on the party manifesto index. Further, there are five parties that have been identified as Euroskeptic by 
our experts and show only slightly positive index values pointing to mixed evaluations of the EU in 
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the manifesto analysis (underlined, Table 1). For five parties we lack manifesto data (in italics, Table 
1). Altogether, there are five parties where expert judgments strongly diverge from party manifesto 
results (in bold font, Table 1): the CU and VVD in the Netherlands and the SLD-UP, PIS, and PSL in 
Poland. As there is no indication that the data from the party manifesto analysis is more accurate than 
our experts’ judgements,2 we rely on the data source that offers information for all parties in our study. 
Yet we keep these five discrepant cases in mind when interpreting the results.  
 
Content analysis of parties’ campaign communication 
To study the campaign communication of parties we conduct a content analysis of parties’ campaign 
posters and their televised campaign spots. To date, different analyses have been carried out to study 
the actual behavior of parties: Party manifestos have been analyzed, print media coverage studied, 
expert and citizen surveys conducted. All of these methods have their strengths, but they also have 
their shortcomings (Netjes & Binnema, 2007) since they only partly measure what parties publicly 
articulate. The most direct way to measure domestic parties’ public mobilization is the analysis of their 
campaign communication. The core messages of parties’ campaigns are epitomized in their campaign 
instruments – the most important being their televised campaign spots and their posters. With these 
instruments, parties directly reach out to the citizens without having to pass through the selection filter 
of the mass media.  
 
For each country we include all televised campaign spots and posters of those parties that won more 
than 3% of the votes in the 2009 EP election. Only for Austria, where televised spots are not common, 
we include newspaper ads as a functional equivalent. The cut-off criterion of 3% of the votes is neces-
sary to limit the number of parties that are analyzed to a manageable size and to create a data base 
which allows for cross-national comparisons. However, we chose a low cut-off point so that fringe 
                                                     
2
 For the Polish PIS party, for example, it is not only our country expert but other researchers (Kopecký & 
Mudde, 2002) as well that classify this party as Euroskeptic – in contrast to the party manifesto data.  
12 
 
parties without electoral success will also be included in the sample. All posters and spots were col-
lected and content analyzed by our cooperation partners in the 11 countries. To ensure the quality of 
the content analysis, a common coder training took place in Berlin which was followed by coding 
exercises and a reliability test which produced satisfactory results (Holsti's reliability coefficient for 
spots: .73; for posters: .83). After the actual coding had been conducted by the native-speaking coop-
eration partners, the data was checked for internal consistency and – if necessary – re-coded in order to 
ensure the best possible quality of data.  
 
To study which type of EU-issues Euroskeptic parties put on their campaign agenda (H1), we first of 
all analyze whether the issues referred to in the spots and posters are discussed from a national, a Eu-
ropean, or a national and European perspective.3 For our analysis only issues with a reference to 
Europe are relevant. For each spot / poster it was possible to code up to ten predefined issues that can 
be catagorized as classical policy issues (economy, social welfare / education, homeland security / law 
and order, immigration, international affairs, culture, environment / agriculture / traffic), polity issues 
(constitutional questions as well as enlargement questions), and politics issues (administration / bu-
reaucracy). To test whether Euroskeptic fringe parties focus more strongly on EU-polity issues com-
pared to Euroskeptic mainstream parties (H1), we compare the share of EU-policy, EU-polity, and 
EU-politics issues for both party types.  
 
To test Hypothesis 2a (degree of EU opposition), we study the amount of critique that is directed to-
wards the European Union. To do so, for each spot or poster we code how the party evaluates the Eu-
ropean Union / EU integration in its current form. The evaluations can either be explicit or expressed 
indirectly by giving positive or negative descriptions of the EU. A value of -1 indicates critique, a 
                                                     
3
 A spot dealing with national taxes is coded as a national scope; a spot dealing with Brussels bureaucracy is coded EU; a 
spot dealing with disputes among EU states (e.g. regarding nuclear power stations in border regions or the weighting of votes 
in the Council) is also coded as an EU scope. Finally, a spot referring to national and EU taxes has a “mixed” scope (EU and 
national).  
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value of +1 support, and a value of 0 shows that the evaluation is either balanced or that there is no 
evaluation of the EU / EU integration. We expect Euroskeptic fringe parties to articulate stronger criti-
cism towards the European Union than Euroskeptic mainstream parties (H2a).  
 
To test whether Euroskeptic fringe parties voice principled opposition against EU integration more 
often than Euroskeptic mainstream parties (Hypothesis 2b), we need to study different forms of EU 
opposition. To do so we code the visions formulated by parties about EU integration. A clear indicator 
for principled, in other words, hard forms of opposition is a vision that calls for a withdrawal from the 
Union. Other visions indicate a non-principled / soft form of EU opposition (for this distinction, see 
Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003), e.g., if parties set their priorities by defining the entity the EU should 
constitute (a trading bloc or a social protection shield, etc.), by emphasizing enlargement or deepening, 
by focusing on democracy or efficiency, or by calling for different concepts of democratization. Final-
ly, there are visions that can neither be classified as purely principled nor as purely non-principled, as 
they do not per se object against the whole integration project, but question the existing allocation of 
competences. These visions see to the nation state as the appropriate level of problem-solving or they 
push for intergovernmental integration.  
 
To study processes of co-orientation, we compare the campaigns of Euroskeptic parties to the cam-
paigns of pro-European parties within each country. For an analysis of Hypothesis 3, we calculate the 
share of EU-polity issues of all EU-issues put on the campaign agenda. We expect that pro-European 
parties discuss the shape and reach of EU integration (EU-polity issues) within a specific country if 
Euroskeptic parties do so too (H3). Finally, for an analysis of Hypothesis 4, we compare the evalua-
tion of the European Union / EU integration in its current form voiced by Euroskeptic parties to the 
evaluation by pro-European mainstream parties. We expect that a strong negative evaluation of the EU 
by Euroskeptic parties is accompanied by pro-European mainstream parties’ clear, positive statements 
on EU integration (H4).  
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Before turning to the results, we need to add a final note on the logic of our data analysis. First, our 
unit of analysis is the party campaign, not the individual spot or poster. As a consequence, we calcu-
lated summary scores for each party to which each poster or televised spot contributes the same. These 
summary scores are based on 218 spots and posters of parties that were classified as Euroskeptic by 
our experts (N = 112 spots / including newspapers ads in the Austrian case; N = 106 posters). For non-
Euroskeptic parties we coded N = 292 spots and posters (N = 112 spots / including newspapers ads in 
the Austrian case); N = 180 posters). Second, any analysis beyond the level of single parties is based 
on these summary scores per party. This means that each party contributes the same to these summary 
scores independent from the number of campaign materials it produced. Further, when calculating 
averages across countries, we additionally controlled for the number of parties within a country to 
make sure that countries with many parties do not distort the overall picture.  
 
 
(5) Results 
Campaign communication of Euroskeptic parties 
On the basis of the party classification in Table 1, we now select parties with a Euroskeptic position 
and study their campaign communication in the 2009 EP elections. Here, we are especially interested 
in finding out if there are systematic differences between fringe and mainstream Euroskeptic parties 
regarding the type of EU-issues they put on the agenda and the degree and form of EU opposition 
voiced in their campaigns.  
Regarding the type of EU-issues on the agenda, we expect that Euroskeptic fringe parties feature EU-
polity issues more prominently compared to Euroskeptic mainstream parties because a discussion of 
EU-polity issues allows them to put the fundamental questions of EU integration on the campaign 
agenda (H1). Figure 1 supports Hypothesis 1. It is the Euroskeptic fringe parties who most openly put 
EU-polity issues on the campaign agenda. Around 50% of all issues addressed in their campaigns with 
a European reference refer to polity (and to a much lesser degree to politics) issues. Euroskeptic main-
stream parties in contrast primarily feature policy issues if they discuss European matters. ANOVA 
analysis shows that the difference between Euroskeptic fringe and mainstream parties is statistically 
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significant. For the ideological more extreme parties, we find support for Mair’s thesis: They cam-
paign exactly on those issues, where the EP has only little competence. Here, right-wing extremists 
stand out: 60% of EU-issue mobilization by radical right-wing parties refer to polity issues, whereas 
radical left-wing parties have a share of only 20%. It is the right-wing extremist parties which not only 
campaign against Europe on a cultural dimension (Adam & Maier, 2009b; Kriesi et al., 2006), but also 
stress the fundamental questions regarding the shape and reach of EU integration within their cam-
paigns.  
 
// Figure 1 
 
Turning to the degree of opposition against the EU and European integration, respectively, we again 
expect that it is the Euroskeptic fringe parties that articulate their critique more strongly than Eu-
roskeptic mainstream parties (H2a). Table 2 summarizes the results regarding these evaluations of 
today’s EU integration. A value of -1 indicates that a party voices critique in each poster or spot it 
releases, whereas + 1 stands for full support of the integration project. Also, Hypothesis 2a seems to be 
supported as Euroskeptic fringe parties on average voice more critique (-.38) than mainstream Eu-
roskeptics (-.20). Yet, this difference does not prove to be statistically significant in ANOVA analysis.  
 
// Table 2 
 
The analysis so far shows that criticizing the EU in public is still the field of the ideologically more 
extreme Euroskeptic parties with only small differences between right and left-wing extremists: Right-
wing extremists have an average score of -.37, whereas left-wing extremists score at -.40.  
 
Finally, we expect that Euroskeptic fringe parties voice principled opposition against EU integration 
more often than Euroskeptic mainstream parties (Hypothesis 2b). We study the form of EU opposition 
by analyzing the future visions for EU integration that parties publicly advance in their campaigns. In 
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general, we can conclude from our data that Euroskeptic parties only seldom envision the future of EU 
integration. Of 218 televised spots and posters, only 81 items contain vision statements. These vision 
statements, however, do not support Hypothesis 2b. Neither Euroskeptic fringe parties nor Euroskeptic 
mainstream parties do in general publicly advance a clear-cut, hard form of EU opposition. There is 
only one country, namely the UK, where Euroskeptic voices formulate clear-cut, principled opposition 
against the EU. The British UKIP and BNP are the only parties in our sample that call for a complete 
withdrawal from the Union. The other Euroskeptic parties in our 11 country sample do not publicly 
advance a comparably hard form of EU opposition. Euroskepticism therefore is communicated diffe-
rently in the UK compared to the rest of continental Europe.  
 
Within continental Europe, different forms of Euroskepticism are voiced in the campaigns. Those 
forms that lie between principled and unprincipled forms of opposition are found among fringe Eu-
roskeptic parties in Bulgaria (ATAKA), the Czech Republic (Suveren), the Netherlands (PVV, SP), 
and Portugal (PCP / PEV). In addition, the Polish PIS, a mainstream party, also shows this form of 
Euroskepticism. These parties promote the national level as superior for problem-solving.4 Such an 
evaluation does not necessarily indicate a rejection of the integration project per se, but it does cast 
doubts whether competences should be shifted to the European level. The other visions formulated in 
the 2009 party campaigns point to unprincipled forms of EU opposition. Here, parties fight over the 
type of entity the EU should constitute or about its core tasks. Frequent among left parties are claims 
that see the EU as a social protection shield (SPÖ in Austria, Linke in Germany, SLD-UP in Poland, 
BE and PCP/ PEV in Portugal, and IU-ICV-EUIA-BA in Spain), as a peace force (KSCM in the 
Czech Republic, Linke in Germany, as well as the two left Portuguese parties BE and PCP / PEV), or 
that call for more transparency and democracy (BE, PCP / PEV in Portugal, IU-CIV-EUIA-BA in 
Spain as well as CDS-PP, a conservative party in Portugal). Visions formulated by right-wing parties 
                                                     
4
 Although one needs to add that this national focus is sometimes combined with references to the EU-level as 
the appropriate level for problem-solving (e.g. PIS, Attack). 
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call for less power of the European Parliament (CU, PVV in the Netherlands, Junilistan in Sweden as 
well as BNP in the UK). The liberals in the Netherlands (VVD) as well as the conservatives in Poland 
(PSL) stress efficiency considerations regarding EU integration.  
 
Euroskeptic parties and the overall campaigns 
In this final section we search for indicators of co-orientation between parties within the same national 
party system. We expect processes of co-orientation to occur as no party on its own has a monopolistic 
control over the campaign agenda. Instead, parties use other parties within the same country as refer-
ence points. Thus, we expect processes of co-orientation to also occur between Euroskeptic and non-
Euroskeptic parties. By taking full advantage of the comparative research design, we study whether 
non-Euroskeptic parties put EU-polity issues on the campaign agenda and voice clear-cut positions 
regarding EU integration if this is what Euroskeptic parties do.  
  
Hypothesis 3 expects that pro-European parties will discuss the shape and reach of EU integration 
(EU-polity issues) if Euroskeptic parties do so within a specific country. As in Figure 1, we divide all 
issues discussed with an EU reference into policy, politics, or polity issues. For our analysis here, we 
focus on the share of polity discussions dealing with the shape and reach of the Union. We have cho-
sen these discussions as they lie at the core of Mair’s (2007) argument that EP campaigns – even if 
they are Europeanized – deal with those issues for which the European Parliament lacks decision-
making power. Table 3 summarizes the results. It shows that in our 11 country sample – contrary to 
Mair’s argument – only about 17% of all issues with an EU reference deal with polity questions. 
Mair’s general argument best describes the campaigning of Euroskeptic (right-wing) parties (26%), 
less so the campaigns of non-Euroskeptic parties (8%). Moreover, it is only in specific countries, 
namely Austria, Bulgaria, Portugal, the UK, and to a lesser degree also the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands, where polity issues play a substantial role in the 2009 campaign agenda.  
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Table 3 does not support the idea of co-orientation between Euroskeptic and non-Euroskeptic parties 
regarding the type of EU-issues discussed. With the exception of the UK and Bulgaria, where non-
Euroskeptic parties also discuss EU-polity issues (however to a lesser extent), we do not find any sign 
for co-orientation. Strong polity mobilization from Euroskeptics in the Czech Republic and the Neth-
erlands is not taken up at all by the non-Euroskeptics. The results in Austria and Portugal are similar. 
This finding is supported by Pearson correlation: We do not find any significant correlation between 
the share of EU-polity issues put on the campaign agenda by Euroskeptic parties and the share articu-
lated by non-Euroskeptic parties. In sum, our data do not support Hypothesis 3. 
 
// Table 3 
 
Finally we search for co-orientation regarding the articulation of clear-cut positions towards EU inte-
gration. For this research question, Hypothesis 4 expects a reversed effect. The stronger Euroskeptic 
parties voice their negative evaluation of the EU in their campaigns, the stronger pro-European parties 
respond with positive evaluations regarding EU integration (H4). If this hypothesis holds true, we 
would be able to observe a true politicization of European politics. Similar to the procedure followed 
in Table 2, we calculate a score ranging from -1 to + 1, where -1 indicates that all campaign material 
of a party contains EU criticism, and a value of +1 shows full support, while 0 indicates a balanced or 
neutral campaign.  
 
Table 4 confirms our hypothesis regarding a co-orientation process with regard to the formulation of 
clear-cut positions towards EU integration. It shows that Euroskeptic parties on average pursue a mod-
erate form of EU criticism (-.21), whereas non-Euroskeptic parties in general campaign in a rather 
neutral way (.05). However, there are three countries in our sample, for which we find strong indica-
tors that the pro-EU consensus is over, namely the Netherlands (-.55), Sweden (-.59), and the UK (-
.67). In these countries, however, we do not find signs that non-Euroskeptic parties take up this criti-
cism. In contrast, we can observe the postulated reversed effect: In these countries non-Euroskeptic 
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parties show the strongest support for EU integration compared to all other countries in the sample. 
Thus, it seems that strong anti-EU mobilization makes the pro-European parties defend their pro-EU 
standpoints with more enthusiasm. If this holds true, we can observe a true politicization of EU inte-
gration – one that is characterized by a publicly visible polarization of opinions and values (De Wilde, 
2007). In all other countries, the difference between Euroskeptic and non-Euroskeptic parties is rela-
tively small. This means that in most cases we find neither strong anti-EU mobilization by the Eu-
roskeptics nor strong positive references by pro-European parties. How close both types of parties 
have become is especially visible in Poland: Here it is the non-Euroskeptics who even surpass the 
Euroskeptic parties in their public criticism of EU integration. By means of Pearson correlation we can 
also confirm such processes of co-orientation statistically. Regressing the evaluation scores of Eu-
roskeptic parties and non-Euroskeptic parties in each country reveals a strong negative correlation 
which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This indicates that more extreme positions on one 
side are accompanied by more extreme positions on the other side.  
 
// Table 4 
 
(5) Conclusion 
What have Euroskeptic parties done in their campaigns in the run-up to the 2009 European Parliament 
elections – which types of EU-issues have they put on their campaign agendas, which degree and form 
of EU opposition have they voiced? And is there co-orientation between Euroskeptic and pro-
European parties with regard to their campaigns? To answer these two questions we conducted an 11 
country comparative study based on a quantitative content analysis of the parties’ campaign materials 
(televised spots and posters). In this conclusion we summarize our main findings in three points and 
then close with some research desiderates.  
 
The first central finding of our study refers to the type of EU-issues parties place on their campaign 
agendas. Our findings question the general applicability of Mair’s thesis (2007): Across all parties and 
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countries EU-polity issues are used less often in the campaigns than EU-policy issues. Consequently, 
at least in reference to parties’ own campaigns, we do not find indicators that citizens’ choices in these 
elections can be called irrelevant as the issues they cast their vote on actually are issues for which the 
European Parliament has competences. However, our study has identified right-wing Euroskeptic 
fringe parties as those openly campaigning on the fundamental question of integration regarding the 
shape and reach of the Union. With their focus on EU-polity issues, Euroskeptic fringe parties clearly 
outweigh Euroskeptic mainstream parties (support for H1). The relatively low salience of EU-polity 
issues in the overall campaigns is also the result of the lack of co-orientation (rejection of H3): Non-
Euroskeptic parties in general do not adopt the polity focus of their Euroskeptic competitors. Only in 
UK and Bulgaria has the debate around the shape and reach of the Union, which especially right-wing 
extremists have placed on the agenda, been picked up by non-Euroskeptic parties. 
 
Second, Euroskepticism in EP campaigns has different facettes with regard to the degree and form of 
opposition presented in the campaigns. In general, it is Euroskeptic fringe parties that challenge the 
pro-EU consensus. These parties criticize the integration process loudly, whereas Euroskeptic main-
stream parties still hesitate to voice their criticism (support for H2a). However, we could not find sup-
port for this clear distinction between Euroskeptic fringe and mainstream parties regarding the form of 
opposition voiced (rejection of H2b). Principled forms of opposition are only rarely voiced among 
Euroskeptic parties in our 11 country sample. Such a principled form of opposition can only be found 
in the UK. UKIP and BNP do not only voice clear-cut EU criticism but also combine this criticism 
with a call for a withdrawal from the Union. This finding indicates that Euroskepticism, also wide-
spread today, has different manifestations that differ between Euroskeptic mainstream and fringe par-
ties. Further, our results indicate that Euroskepticism means something different on the British Isles 
compared to continental Europe.  
 
Third, we can observe a true politicization of EU integration – one that is characterized by a publicly 
visible polarization of opinions and values. In those countries where Euroskeptic parties most harshly 
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criticize EU integration (i.e., the Netherlands, Sweden, and UK), non-Euroskeptic parties show the 
most positive EU evaluations in our 11 country sample. The notion that non-Euroskeptics are pushed 
into an active defense of their pro-EU positions is also confirmed statistically: The more extreme 
negative evaluations are voiced by Euroskeptics, the more positive positions are also presented by pro-
Europeans (support of H4). This effect turns out to be statistically significant. If this holds true in other 
settings, we can speak of a reversed mobilization effect (for a similar concept applied to citizens, see 
Schuck & De Vreese, 2009) that leads to politicization. In this election we have observed such politi-
cization in the Netherlands, in Sweden, and the UK. In these countries parties have taken the opportu-
nity to differentiate themselves in EU terms (Eijk & Franklin, 2004). As a result, we question whether 
the description of EP campaigns as uncontested and purely national is still valid. At least under specif-
ic conditions we find that contrary positions regarding EU integration are voiced.  
 
Where should we head from here? Our analysis shows that the distinction between Euroskeptic posi-
tions and actual Euroskeptic mobilization is important. We agree with Szczerbiak and Taggard 
(Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003) that this distinction can help eliminate much confusion in research 
about Euroskeptic parties. This goes along with the fact that one needs to measure and explain parties’ 
Euroskeptic positions and campaign mobilization with different factors. Regarding explanations, we 
need to rely on strategic considerations to explain mobilization, whereas ideological considerations are 
more important to understand positions  (Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003). In reference to measurement, 
we have suggested to use expert judgments as indicator for the underlying ideological orientation, 
whereas we seek to measure parties’ actual campaign communication with the method of content 
analysis. A combination of both data sources on Euroskepticism has its advantages. First, it allows us 
to show that Euroskeptic positions do not necessarily translate into Euroskeptic mobilization. In our 
study, Euroskepticism has gone mainstream position-wise, but less so mobilization-wise. It is main-
stream Euroskeptic parties that have refrained from discussing EU-polity issues and that have been 
hesitant to openly criticize the EU.  Second, we can compare whether ideologically similar types of 
Euroskeptic parties also use similar campaign strategies. In this paper, we have distinguished main-
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stream and fringe Euroskeptic parties. Yet, we see the necessity for future research to work with more 
fine-grained classifications. Finally, such a distinction has the advantage that we do not confound all 
critique towards the EU with Euroskepticism. General EU supporters may well formulate criticism 
towards the Union, which does not automatically turn them into Euroskeptic parties.  
 
Last but definitely not least, further research should more closely analyze the concept of co-
orientation. Our results suggest that co-orientation exists between Euroskeptic and non-Euroskeptic 
parties within the national party systems with regard to their campaign strategies. Yet, further research 
is necessary to analyze in which areas this co-orientation occurs and under which conditions it hap-
pens. Of special interest for further research is the reversed mobilization effect regarding parties’ EU-
evaluations. If we can confirm that strong criticism towards the EU by Euroskeptic parties leads to a 
counter-mobilization on the side of pro-European parties, then we would have uncovered an important 
mechanism fostering the polarization of opinions on - and thereby politicization of - EU integration.  
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Table 1: Euroskeptic parties included in the study (experts’ judgement) 
 Euroskeptic fringe parties Euroskeptic mainstream parties 
Austria Bündnis Zukunft Österreich [BZÖ] (4.6; 
Rext), Freiheitliche Partei Österreich [FPÖ] 
(12.7; Rext), Liste Dr. Martin [Liste M] 
(17.7; Rext) 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs 
[SPÖ] (23.7; L; PIREDEU: +2.0.), 
Bulgaria National Union Attack [ATAKA] (12.0; 
Rext) 
Order, Law and Justice .[RZS/P3C] (4.7; 
R) 
Czech Republic Suverenita [Suveren] (4.3;, Rext), Komunis-
ticka strana Cech a Moravy [KSCM] (14.2; 
Lext) 
Obcanska demokraticka strana [ODS] 
(31.5; R) 
Germany DIE LINKE [Linke] (7.5; Lext; PIREDEU: 
+0.24) 
 
Hungary Jobbik Magyarorszagert Mozgalom [JOB-
BIK] (14.8; Rext) 
 
Netherlands Socialistische Partij [SP] (7.1; Lext), Partij 
voor de Vrijheid [PVV] (17.0; Rext), 
Christen Unie [CU] (6.8; R; PIREDEU: 
+11.03), Partij voor de Dieren [PvdD] 
(3.5;, R), Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie [VVD] (11.4; Lib; PIRE-
DEU: +9.41) 
Poland 
 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – Unia 
Pracy [SLD-UP] (12.3; L; PIREDEU: 
6.73), Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 
[PSL] (7.0; R; PIREDEU: 10.65), 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc [PIS] (27.4; R, 
PIREDEU: 6.27) 
Portugal Bloco de Esquerda [BE] (10.7; Lext), CDU-
Coligacao Democratica Unitaria [PCP / 
Partido Popular [CDS-PP] (8.4; R; PIRE-
DEU: +1.51) 
27 
 
PEV] (10.7; Lext) 
Spain Izquierda Unida [IU-ICV-EUIA-BA] (3.7; 
Lext, PIREDEU: +.74) 
 
Sweden Vänsterpartiet [V] (5.7; Lext), Sverigede-
mokraterna [SD] (3.3; Rext) 
Miljöpartiet de gröna [MP] (11; Greens), 
Junilistan [Junilistan] (3.6;--), Piratpar-
tiet¨[PP]. (7.1; Lib), Arbetarepartiet-
Socialdemokraterna [S] (24.4; L; PIRE-
DEU: +1.39) 
UK British National Party [BNP] (6.0.; Rext) Conservative Party [Cons] (27.0; R), Unit-
ed Kingdom Independence Party [UKIP] 
(16.1; R) 
Note I: in bracket (vote share in the 2009 EP election; ideological orientation of party: L = Left (social democrats), R = Right 
(conservatives / Christian democrats), Lext = radical left / communists, Rext =radical / populist right; Lib = liberals, Greens; 
-- = not classifiable);  
Note II: in italics = not included in EES study; underlined = slight positive value in EES study; bold = value significantly 
above 0 in EES study. 
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Table 2: Evaluations of EU integration by types of Euroskeptic parties 
 EU evalua-
tion (mean) 
SD N 
Fringe Euroskeptics -38 .37 16 
Mainstream Euroskeptics -20 .48 16 
Total (Euroskeptics) -.29 .43 32 
Basis: N=32 parties;  
Calculation: Mean evaluation score [-1,+1]; -1 = critique only; +1= support only; 
Test: ANOVA; difference between fringe and mainstream parties does not prove to be statistically 
significant. 
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Table 3: Share of polity issues of all issues discussed with an EU reference ─ co-orientation 
% (aver-
age) 
Aus Bul CZ Ger Hun NL Pol Port Sp Sw UK Total 
Euroskeptics 37.5 75.0 33.3 0 -- 36.4 11.1 38.5 0 6.7 48.3 26.07 
Non-
Euroskeptics 
7.1 16.7 0 0 0 0 28.6 10.4 0 4.2 25.0 8.36 
Country 
average 
27.4 36.1 20.0 0 0 20.2 15.5 27.3 0 5.2 36.7 17.13 
N (party 
campaigns 
6 3 5 5 1 9 4 5 4 7 4 53 
Basis: N = 53 parties, (N = 13 missing, as these parties do not discuss issues with an EU reference  ─ at least for the fixed 
issue categories); 
Test: Pearson correlation between %-EU-polity issues of Euroskeptics and non-Euroskeptics per country; positive correlation 
(r = .41); not statistically significant. 
 
 
Table 4 Evaluation of EU integration ─ co-orientation 
Mean Aus Bul CZ Ger Hun NL Pol Port Sp Sw UK Total 
Euroskeptics -.12 .00 -.06 .00 .00 -.55 .09 -.16 -.22 -.59 -.67 -.21 
Non-
Euroskeptics 
.06 .06 -.10 .04 .09 .13 -.11 .04 .00 .24 .11 .05 
EU-
evaluation 
(country) 
-.06 .04 -.07 .03 .07 -.25 .04 -.08 -.06 -.26 -.28 -.08 
N (party 
campaigns 
6 8 5 5 4 9 4 5 4 10 6 66 
Basis: N = 66 parties;  
Remark: Each country contributes the same to the average score across countries (consequence: results slightly diverge from 
the numbers in Table 2); 
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Test: Pearson correlation between mean evaluation of Euroskeptics and non-Euroskeptics per country; negative correlation 
(r.= -.70); statistically significant on the p < 0.05 level.  
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Figure 1: The average share of polity, politics, and policy issues of all issues with an EU reference per 
type of Euroskeptic party 
 
 
 
Basis: N = 26 party campaigns (N=6 missing, as these parties do not discuss issues with an EU reference – at least for the 
fixed issue categories); 
Test: ANOVA; difference between fringe and mainstream Euroskeptic parties regarding their EU-policy issue articulation is 
statistically significant on the p<0.05 level. 
  
 
 
 
